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Section I: Introduction 
 The general and long held view amongst economists is that a minimum wage 
will reduce employment in a competitive labour market.
2  For example, Stigler (1946) 
noted: “The higher the minimum wage, the greater the number of covered workers 
who are discharged”.   Importantly, however, this view implicitly assumes a 
theoretical framework where the labour input can be thought of as total hours and 
total hours is defined the product of workers and hours per worker. One can arguably 
though think of a number of different reasons why firms may not take the labour input 
in the production function as the product of hours and workers.  The most basic one is 
if hours per worker have a diminishing marginal product. Alternatively, firms may 
have different hours technologies – for example, a long haul trucking company with a 
couple of large trucks may want a small number of workers with long hours, while a 
local delivery service may be able to have a large number of workers using the same 
vehicle.  It may also be that differences in the firm’s demand for the mix of bodies 
and hours come from the demand conditions facing the firm.  For instance, a 
restaurant in an office district may be very busy for short periods and require a large 
number of part time workers, while a high street restaurant may be busy over longer 
periods that facilitate hiring a larger share of full-time workers. 
In this paper we thus examine what happens in the standard competitive model 
when firms are able to choose the number of workers and hours per worker and pay 
compensating differentials for different levels of hours per worker.  Our results show 
that in such an arguably very plausible setting the impact of minimum wages on hours 
per worker, the number of workers, and total hours worked is in fact ambiguous.  
Importantly, the ambiguity of the employment effect in our model does not arise from 
                                                 
2 See Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a survey of the literature on the effect of 
minimum wages on the labour market.   3 
 
the inability to pin down substitution effects in a complex model with many 
heterogeneous factors, but rather comes from applying a minimum wage to a 
framework that is commonly used in the literature to model how firm’s choose 
combinations of hours and workers in a competitive labour market.  We also show 
that total hours may rise or fall at the industry level when we allow for firm entry and 
exit. 
In contrast to the competitive model, it is of course generally well known that 
the effect of a minimum wage on employment is not clear in non-competitive models 
of the labour market.  For example, the theoretical possibility that minimum wages 
may increase employment in a monopsony model was noted as early as Stigler 
(1946), although he discounted the importance of such models at the time.  A more 
recent literature argues that the Monopsony model is perhaps more relevant in modern 
labour markets [See Manning (2003)] and Bhaskar and To (1999), Walsh (2003) and 
Strobl and Walsh (2007), amongst others, present more recent versions of the 
monopsony model which illustrate the ambiguity of minimum wage employment 
effects.  Also, De Fraja (1999) shows that the employment effects of a minimum wage 
are small in a model with heterogeneity in workers preferences over wages and 
working conditions, while Rebitzer and Taylor  (1995) demonstrate that minimum 
wages may increase employment in an efficiency wage model where monitoring 
becomes more difficult as employment increases.  We argue here that regardless of 
whether one takes a competitive or a non-competitive view of the labour market, the 
theoretically derived effect of a minimum wage on employment is ambiguous.   
One should note that the model we use to demonstrate our argument is based 
on the notion that firms substitute between hours and workers in response to a 
minimum wage.  However, it could be that the minimum wage graph many of us   4 
 
became familiar with as undergraduates – i.e., where hours are fixed and a minimum 
wage unambiguously leads to some workers being fired in competitive labour markets 
as firms moved up the labour demand curve - is more appropriate.  However, while 
there are differences across the literature, many empirical studies have rather found 
substantial movements in hours associated with changes in minimum wages, 
suggesting that both hours per worker and the number of workers may be affected.  
More precisely, summarizing the results from the earlier empirical literature on the 
impact of minimum wages on hours, Brown (1999) concludes that “hours per week 
fall when minimum wages increase, so the effect on hours worked is more 
pronounced than the effect on bodies employed” (p. 2156).  Michl (2000) finds a 
reduction in hours from the widely documented 1990 New Jersey minimum wage 
increase and argues that this may partly explain conflicting empirical results found by 
others.  Other examples in this regard include Neumark and Schweitzer (2000) or 
Couch and Wittenberg (2001) who both discover a significant reduction in hours 
using a panel of U.S states, where the former argue that minimum wage workers are 
adversely affected by a minimum wage increase. Also, for the UK Stewart and 
Swaffield (2006) find that the U.K minimum wage reduced hours particularly for 
males.   
Nevertheless, while many of the more recent studies that examine the effect on 
hours do indeed find a reduction therein, this is not always the case.  For example, 
Katz and Krueger (1992) discover a fall in part-time work for the U.S.  Similarly, 
Zavodney (2000) using a panel of US states finds a fall in the number of workers but 
increase in hours.  Connolly and Gregory (2002) found no effect on hours for women 
from the national minimum wage in the U.K..  The literature indicates that there is   5 
 
little evidence that hours remain fixed in response to a minimum wage, and that 
additionally for hours per worker the direction of the impact is not clear-cut.
3 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  In the next section we 
outline our model in a partial equilibrium framework at the firm level.  In Section III 
we discuss market equilibrium in the short run, in section IV we model firm entry and 
long run equilibrium, section V Discusses the impact of the minimum wage on worker 
utility and profits in long run equilibrium and the final section concludes. 
 
 
Section II: The firm level response to a minimum wage 
The theoretical treatment of minimum wages in the literature when firms 
choose a combination of hours per worker and workers is rather limited.  Hamermesh 
(1993) develops a model that deals with the firm’s choice of workers and hours in a 
cost minimisation framework (similar to that illustrated in Figure 2 below) which 
includes a brief discussion of minimum wages, while Michl (2000) outlines a model 
where firms with a Cobb-Douglas production function over hours and workers choose 
workers and hours to minimise cost, assuming that the wage does not increase with 
hours.  Other studies, such as Stewart and Swaffield (2006), Zavodney (2000), 
Neumark and Schweitzer (2000), and Connolly and Gregory (2002) contain some 
general discussions on how mimimum wages are related to hours but do not build a 
formal theoretical model. 
In this paper we apply a minimum wage to Kinoshita’s (1987) model which 
derives the equilibrium properties of a competitive labour market.  In general the 
equilibrium hours per worker hourly wage locus h(w) [we will refer to this as the 
hours wage locus from now on] is a set of tangencies where workers who wish to 
                                                 
3 See Neumark and Wascher (2007) page 40 for details on this literature, as well as an update of the 
large literature on employment effects on the number of workers and total hours.   6 
 
work longer hours match up with like-minded firms.  In equilibrium the supply and 
demand of each worker type are equal and no worker or firm can gain from deviating 
to another point on the locus. Compensating wage differentials are paid to workers for 
working a less desirable number of hours
4.  Firms are assumed to be able to hire as 
many workers as they wish at any level of hours (h).  If there are only a small number 
of worker types, or one type as in the example we illustrate explicitly, the workers’ 
indifference curve is the equilibrium hours wage locus.  Figure 1 illustrates a tangency 
between the indifference curve of a representative worker and the isoprofit curve of a 
firm and is based on the simulation of the Cobb-Douglas example described in 
Appendix 1.  We will use this example throughout the paper to illustrate the results.   
It may be worth emphasising that even though firms will choose the wage in 
the model below, this is not indicative of any market power.  Firms are price takers 
and can hire as many workers as they wish at any given level of hours.  In a 
competitive labour market though, the competitive wage needed to induce different 
levels of hours will differ and firms can choose any point on the equilibrium hours 
wage locus. 
In this section we assume our model is partial equilibrium in that we ignore 
the potential impact of the policy on the equilibrium hours wage locus or cost of firm 
entry.  The firm’s profit function is: 
  (, ) [,() ] () n w pf n h w wnh w kn     (1.1) 
where h is hours per worker , n is the number of workers.  There are fixed costs k per 
worker. The output price p is given to the firm and the production function 
                                                 
4 The models of Lewis (1969) and Rosen (1986) are the precursors to this model.      7 
 
(,) qf h n  satisfies 0  n f , 0  h f , 0  nn f .
5  The firm’s choice of w and n at an 
interior solution satisfies the following first order conditions: 
 
(,) [,() ] () () 0
(, ) [,() ] () 0
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   One can assess the impact of a minimum wage on the number of workers by 
totally differentiating the first order condition on n.  Evaluating this differential at the 
initial equilibrium where  qhn  is the percentage change in the marginal product of 
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 (1.3) 
Proposition 1: A sufficient condition for the change in the number of workers 
employed at a firm in response to a minimum wage to have the opposite sign to the 
slope of the hours wage locus is that the scale effect of output on hours per worker is 
negative or zero. 
 
Proof:  
If the scale effect for hours per worker are negative or zero we show in Appendix 2 















has the opposite sign to w h 6. 
                                                 
5 If costs of hiring workers were convex rather than the constant k as we assume, the firm would 
effectively behave as a monopsonist since worker costs would increase with employment, [see 
Manning (2003) p34-35].   
6 We also see from (1.3) that 
dn
dw
 and  w h  will have the opposite sign if: 1 qhn   .   8 
 
   The proposition shows that if the assumption is true a minimum wage will 
lead to an increase in the number of workers if the hours wage locus has a positive 
slope and a decrease if the locus has a negative slope.  We use Figure 2 to illustrate 
the intuition for the proposition.  In contrast to Figure 1 which graphs the isoprofit and 
indifference curves, Figure 2 depicts the isocost/isoquant graph for an individual 
firm.
7 The isocost curve gives the employment hours combinations that are available 
at a fixed level of cost:  0 () Cw h w n n k   as defined in Appendix 1 for the Cobb-
Douglas example.  The isoquant shows the combinations of hours and workers that 
give a fixed level of output:  (,) o HH n h  where H is the aggregate labour input for 
the Cobb-Douglas function.  The initial equilibrium graphed in Figure 2, where the 
isocost and isoquant curves are tangent, gives the cost minimising bundle of 
hours/workers that can produce the desired output.  Of course the level of hours in 
Figure 2 corresponds to the equilibrium level of hours in Figure 1.  When the 
minimum wage is imposed and the wage hours locus is upward sloping, the firm is 
forced to pay a higher wage, but can get a higher level of hours per worker in return 
(as we saw in Figure 1).  In Figure 2 the increase in hours implies that at fixed output 
the firm substitutes from workers into hours moving along the isoquant.  Equation 
A(1.32) in Appendix 2 derives this substitution effect and we see from this equation 
that the change in the number of workers will certainly have the opposite sign to the 
slope of the wage hours locus.  Of course the minimum wage may also cause output 
to change which will in turn affect the demand for workers and hours.  We could 
imagine the isoquant in Figure 2 shifting in response to the minimum wage which 
would in turn change the demand for workers and hours.  Indeed from (1.3) and the 
production function we see that the change in firm output from a minimum wage is: 
                                                                                                                                            
 
7 The graphical analysis used here draws on the analysis used in Hamermesh (1993).   9 
 
  [( ) ]
h
nh
nh n h w
nn
f
f df dn dh n f ff f h
dw dw dw f

   (1.4) 
In equation A(1.29) in Appendix 2 we show that the term in square brackets in (1.4) 
will be positive/negative  if hours per worker is inferior/not inferior
8.   This implies 
that if the wage hours locus has a positive sign the change in output from imposing a 
minimum wage will be positive unless hours are an inferior input.  That is if 
0 w h  and hours are not inferior the minimum wage will cause an increase in output.  
The assumption that scale effects on hours are zero in Proposition 1 ensures that the 
output effect on the number of worker can never outweigh the substitution effect 
given in A(1.32) .  While this assumption is sufficient for Proposition 1 it is easy to 
find examples of commonly used production functions where the change in the 
number of workers will be inversely related to the slope of the wage hours locus even 
when scale effects are positive
9.  The literature modeling a firm’s choice of workers 
and hours commonly assumes that scale effects are zero
10.  In addition it has been 
noted in the literature that the intuition for hours increasing or decreasing 
systematically with the scale of production is not clear.  For example   Hamermesh 
(1993) argues , that “...there is no evidence that weekly hours of full-time workers at 
                                                 
8 In the more standard case where a firm has two inputs with separate prices (say a firm using capital 
and labour) a necessary condition for a factor to be inferior is that the cross partial derivative between 
the inputs in the production function must be negative [see Bear (1965)].   
9 For the constant elasticity of substitution production function 
1
(,) [ ] fn h A h n
      we 











 will always hold  even though the scale effect on hours 
is positive if the elasticity of substitution 
1
1  
 is less than one.  The Cobb-Douglas case is 
0   where scale effects are zero. 
6For example Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001) and Hamermesh (1993) use a technology with this 
assumption while Hamermesh (1993) discusses this literature and the functional forms used.   10 
 
General Motors differ substantially from hours of workers at the local steel 
fabricator”(p.50). 
   A puzzling implication of Proposition 1 is that much of the existing empirical 
evidence discussed earlier finds a decline in hours per worker from a minimum wage.  
If this were so Proposition 1 implies that affected firms should be increasing the 
number of workers, but would also imply that workers are on a negatively sloped 
hours wage locus.  There is no reason that this should not be so in theory, but one may 
suspect that many economists would expect the contrary.  For example, Hamermesh 
(1993) assumes the equilibrium locus has a positive slope in his treatment of the 
theory of hours per workers, while Michl (2000) supposes the locus is flat.   
Interestingly, in a monopsony model where the supply of workers to the firm depends 
on the utility of the hours wage combination offered by the firm, a fall in hours in 
response to a minimum wage does not imply a downward sloping hours wage locus 
[see Strobl and Walsh (2007) for example]
11.  That is, if one wishes to reconcile 
reductions in hours per worker with an upward sloping wage hours locus which 
violates Proposition 1, non-competitive models can easily do this.  This apart, the 
proposition should certainly make one reluctant to conclude that one can infer 
whether the labour market is competitive or not by looking at the results of studies 
that focus on the number of workers, as some of the literature does, since theory has 
no clear prediction on the change in hours per worker and predicts an offsetting 
change in the number of workers.  
                                                 
11 This conclusion may not be immediately obvious from reading Strobl and Walsh (2007) but it is 
straightforward to show using the model simulated in that paper that there is a range of parameters 
where the wage hours locus is positively sloped but a minimum wage reduces hours.  The range where 
this is true expands with the degree of monopsony power.  A maple file containing this simulated 
model is available from the authors.    11 
 
We next examine the conditions under which a minimum wage will increase 
total hours
12.  In this regard we define the elasticity of output with respect to workers 








  .  It follows 

















If one thinks of employment as total hours (nh), then using (1.4) and (1.5) the 
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   (1.6) 
In Appendix 3 (a) we show that the elasticity of total hours with respect to a minimum 


















We show in Appendix 3(a) that x>0 if hours are not an inferior input.  A feature of 
this result is that one does not need extreme values for the elasticities of output with 
respect to workers and hours for the impact on total hours to be positive.  For example 
take the case where the elasticity of output with respect to workers exceeds the 
elasticity of output with respect to hours( qn qh    ), but these elasticities are similar.  
Even if the scale effect was zero (x=0) the presence of small fixed costs (k>0) would 
ensure that the condition in (1.7) was satisfied.  It is equally true that if fixed costs 
were zero but there were positive scale effect the condition would hold.  
                                                 
12 Neumark and Wascher (2007) note “..although much of the literature has focused on the employment 
effects of the minimum wage, the predictions of theory tend to be about overall labour input rather than 
employment specifically.. (p.166)”.     12 
 
  Another way of illustrating the cases where total hours may increase is by 
establishing the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Sufficient conditions for a minimum wage to increase total hours 
worked are that the hours wage locus has a positive slope, that    qn qh     and that 
hours are not an inferior input. 
Proof: See Appendix 3 (a) 
 
This implies that if some of the combinations of assumptions often made in 
this literature hold, then total hours will increase. As noted earlier, it is common to 
assume that the wage hours locus has a positive slope, while Feldstein (1967) and 
Michl (2000) amongst others explicitly assume qn qh    .  We do not wish to argue 
based on Proposition 2 that one should typically expect total hours to increase.  Rather 
it is to show that when one uses the type of simple competitive models that are used to 
establish the intuition that minimum wages lower employment, modifying the model 
using the standard approaches that have been used to analyse how a firm combines 
workers and hours, the result becomes ambiguous.  This is so for parameter 
assumptions that have been commonly made in the hours/worker literature. 
 
Section III: Market Equilibrium 
Section II analyses the response to a minimum wage of a firm in a competitive 
model for given market conditions (i.e., a given hours wage locus).  Of course it may 
well be that the equilibrium hours wage locus is affected by the minimum wage, but it 
would be very difficult to explicitly solve for market equilibrium in a model with 
many worker and firm types.  For this reason we focus on a simple model with a   13 
 
representative firm and assume that workers have identical preferences over hours and 
wages and differ only in their disutility from going to work in a way that is described 
below.  Imposing these assumptions limits the degree of heterogeneity across workers 
and firms and means that we ignore any potential spill-over effects across different 
types of workers and firms resulting from a minimum wage.  However, since the main 
conclusion of the paper is that employment effects are ambiguous, our contention is 
that it is unlikely that generalising the model to include greater heterogeneity across 
workers and firms would lead to an unambiguous result.   
To solve fully for the impact of the minimum wage on the market equilibrium 
we must make assumptions about the supply of workers and about firm entry on the 
demand side.  We will ignore firm entry until the next section. We can think of the 
analysis in this section as focusing on short run market equilibrium.  This will tell us 
how remaining firms will respond to the change in equilibrium conditions brought 
about by the minimum wage. 
We might expect that at the level of the market the number of workers willing 
to supply labour would increase as the utility of employment increased.  To take 
account of this in a tractable way we proceed as follows:  We assume that workers 
satisfy the constraints h=(T-l), where h is hours worked and T is a time endowment 
which is common to all workers and l is leisure.  Consumption expenditure is x 
(where workers satisfy the budget constraint wh=x).  Utility is increasing in 
consumption and leisure.  Substituting for the above constraints one gets the utility 
function  [( ,) , ] uDhw v, which we assume is weakly separable in v.
13  We assume that 
the utility function is monotonically decreasing in the parameter v which is distributed 
over a mass M of workers according to the function G(v). All workers have 
                                                 
13 This model of labour supply is based on Strobl and Walsh (2007).   14 
 
reservation utility S.  These assumptions ensure that at any equilibrium hours wage 
bundle (w
*,h
*) workers with low enough values of v such that their utility at  (, ) Dhw 
exceeds the reservation level S will supply labour.  The framework implies that if the 
number of workers willing to supply labour increases the value of v for the marginal 
worker that participates will also increase.  This means that  (, ) Dhw must increase to 
ensure this workers participation since the marginal worker gets utility of exactly S.  
Weak separability of v ensures that each worker that supplies labour is on the same 
indifference curve over hours and wages, which is just the indifference curve of the 
marginal worker.  Since this indifference curve gives the rate at which each worker 
trades off hourly wages and hours, it is the equilibrium hours wage locus which each 
firm takes as given.  If a policy such as a minimum wage were to lead to an 
equilibrium with a higher number of workers, this implies that the marginal worker 
must have a higher value of v.  The indifference curve of this worker would now be 
the equilibrium hours wage locus.  That is, the policy may shift the equilibrium locus 
and we must take account of this shift on the firm’s choice of hours and workers.  The 
equilibrium value of v
* ensures that: 
 
* [( ,) ,] uDhw v S   (1.8) 
 That is 
*(, ) vh w is the value of v for the marginal worker who is just willing to supply 
labour.  We can map from the equilibrium value of v* to get labour supply:  
 
* (, ) [ ]
s Nh w M G v   (1.9) 
Also from (1.9) once we know v* we can solve for the equilibrium hours locus that 
the firms face, which is just the indifference curve of the marginal worker.  The 
equilibrium level of utility/profit is determined where labour supply equals labour 
demand:   15 
 
 
* (, ) [(, ) ]
dd Nh w nh w vF   (1.10) 
The number of firms which is fixed in the short run is F and the demand for workers 
at each firm is: [() ]
d nw h.  Equations (1.9) and (1.10) will be equalised in market 
equilibrium.  This is illustrated in Figure 3 for the Cobb-Douglas example outlined in 
Appendix 1
14.  For expositional purposes we will refer to relationship between v and 
the number of workers as inverse supply and demand curves below. We see in Figure 
3 that there is a downward sloping inverse demand curve and upward sloping inverse 
supply curve.   
To calculate the change in the demand for workers after a minimum wage we 
totally differentiate the first order condition on workers from equation (1.2): 
 [] [ ] 0
d
nn n n h ww n h v d p fd n p fh w h h d w p f w h d v         (1.11) 
The first two terms in (1.11) correspond to the total derivative from the firm’s 
problem used to derive equation (1.3).  The final term in (1.11) reflects the change the 
market hours wage locus from a change in v.  Using the first order condition on hours 








wv w w v w
nn nn
f
f wp f dN dn n FF n n v F h h v
dw dw f pf
 
     (1.12) 








  (1.13) 
 From (1.12) and (1.13) we see that if the market moves to a new equilibrium after the 
minimum wage we should have ()
dd
wv v v w Fn nv M Gv  .  Proposition 1 establishes 
conditions where 
d
w n will have the opposite sign to the hours wage locus.  We will see 
                                                 
14 Figure 3 also includes the long run demand curve which will be modelled in the next section.   16 
 
that in many cases and indeed for the Cobb-Douglas case we analyse explicitly
d
v n will 
have the opposite sign to
d
w n .  This means that even when market labour demand and v 
are negatively related in an unconstrained market as in Figure 3 there will often be a 
positive co-movement between labour demand and v after a minimum wage.  To 
explain this we note that an unconstrained firm will respond to an increase in v (a shift 
in the hours wage locus) by adjusting the hours wage combination.  On the other hand 
if a minimum wage is imposed a firm cannot change the wage in response to a shift in 
the hours wage locus and the entire adjustment is in hours.  Imagine firms are on a 
positive wage hours locus (as in Figure 1) and a minimum wage is enforced.  From 
Proposition 1 all firms lay-off workers causing a decrease in the market value of v (a 
downward shift in the hours wage locus).  The decrease in v shifts the hours wage 
locus downward which induces firms to increase hours further if the firm is on 
positively sloped hours wage locus since as we show in Appendix 3(b)   and  wv hh have 
opposite signs under a minimum wage.  In summary, the initial reduction in the 
number of workers caused by the minimum wage causes a decrease in v which causes 
a further increase in hours.  This increase in hours may induce firms to lay-off more 
workers which explains why there may be a positive relationship between the change 
in v and the number of workers after a minimum wage. Even if this is so we can solve 
for the new equilibrium as long as the slope of the inverse labour supply curve 
v MG (which is positive by assumption) is greater than the slope of the restricted 
inverse labour demand where the wage is fixed.  Figure 4 illustrates 
d
v n and  v MG for 
the Cobb-Douglas case we analyse in Appendix 1.  Even though the unrestricted 
inverse labour demand curve (in Figure 3) is downward sloping in v worker space, the 
restricted inverse demand curve (plotted in Figure 4) slopes upward when a minimum   17 
 
wage is imposed for the reasons discussed above.  We see for the Cobb-Douglas 
example that since the restricted inverse labour demand curve in Figure 4 is flatter 
than the inverse labour supply curve, we can solve for equilibrium after a minimum 
wage but the equilibrium fall in the number of workers after a minimum wage will be 
greater than the initial response by firms.  However if the restricted inverse labour 
demand curve were steeper than the inverse labour supply curve the labour market 
would diverge from the initial equilibrium after a minimum wage is imposed and we 
cannot solve for equilibrium
15.  The Propositions below focus on the case where we 
can solve for equilibrium after the minimum wage.    
 
Proposition 1(a):  A sufficient condition for Proposition one to continue holding for 
the aggregate number of workers in short run market equilibrium is that the restricted 
market inverse demand curve in worker v space is flatter than the market supply curve 
after a minimum wage is imposed.  
Proof:  See Appendix 3 (c) 
  
 
Proposition 2(a):  A sufficient condition for Proposition two to continue holding for 
total market hours worked in short run market equilibrium is that the restricted 
market inverse demand curve in worker v space is flatter than the market supply curve 
after a minimum wage is imposed. 
Proof: See Appendix 3 (d) 
 
                                                 
15 This will be true if  0
d
vv MG n     18 
 
Proposition 1(a) and 2(a) tell us that in any case where the slope of the inverse supply 
and demand curves are such that we can solve for labour market equilibrium after a 
minimum wage Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 will continue to hold.   
 
Section IV: Firm entry 
In this section we extend the analysis in section III to allow for the fact that in 
the long run a minimum wage may affect firm’s profits and in turn the number of 
firms.  In a competitive model where hours are held fixed after a minimum wage there 
would be an excess supply of workers.   The impact on profits would be small as long 
as firms had been optimising and the minimum wage only leads to a small increase in 
the wage.  This may no longer be the case when we allow hours to vary.  The 
minimum wage causes substitution between hours and workers.  If the supply of 
workers is positively related to worker utility, the effect of each firm attempting to 
hire more/less workers in response to a minimum wage will be to cause the hours 
wage locus to shift up/down as we saw in the previous section.  This shift in the 
equilibrium hours wage locus will indeed have a first order effect on profits.
16  We 
will assume that there is free entry of firms but the fixed cost of firm entry is driven 
up as the number of firms F increases.  In equilibrium the number of firms will be 
such that the fixed entry cost  () E F equals firm profits and so the mass of firms is 
increasing as profits increase.  The minimum wage affects firm profits by shifting the 
hours wage locus through the parameter v.  We can write: 
 
dF dF d dv
nn





                                                 
16 Bhaskar and To (1999) show in a monopsony model that while the immediate impact of a small 
minimum wage on the profits of an optimising firm will be second order, there is a first order negative 
impact on profits since the firms labour supply curve depends not only on its own wage but on the 
relative wage of other firms which increase.   19 
 
Totally differentiating the profit function we note that since we impose a small 
minimum wage starting at the optimum the first order conditions for the firm (1.2) 
will continue to hold so that  0 nw     and the total derivative of the profit 
function is: 
  () hv




  (1.15) 





 .  Using both of 




h dd v d v
hn
dv dw h dw

  (1.16) 
 We proceed to incorporate the impact on profits into the analysis of section 
III.  The expression for 
dn
dw
 below is derived in the same way as (1.12) but we also 
account for firm entry using (1.16): 
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   Proposition 1(b):  A sufficient condition for Proposition 1(a) to continue to hold in 
long run market equilibrium is that the firms inverse demand curve in worker v space 
is flatter than the market supply curve after a minimum wage is imposed. 
Proof: See Appendix 3 (e) 
 
 We note that the firm entry term in (1.17) reduces the slope of the inverse demand 
curve in v worker space.  That is the proposition is more likely to hold in long run 
equilibrium than in short run equilibrium.  As with the short run analysis the condition 
that the firms inverse demand curve is flatter than the inverse supply curve implies   20 
 
that we are restricting the analysis to cases where we can solve for equilibrium after a 
minimum wage.  We can also now establish the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2(b):  Proposition two continues to hold for total market hours worked in 
long run market equilibrium if the firm’s inverse demand curve in worker v space is 
flatter than the market supply curve after a minimum wage is imposed. 
Proof: See Appendix 3 (f) 
 
It may be useful to illustrate these results in a familiar example.  In the long run 
equilibrium section of Appendix 1 we assume a linear relationship between firm entry 
and the level of profit and additionally assume that the weight on workers b equals 
one minus a the weight on hours.  Using the parameter values given in Table A1 
Figure 3 graphs the inverse supply and long run inverse demand curve illustrating the 
unrestricted equilibrium while Figure 4 illustrates that the restricted inverse demand 
curve is indeed flatter than the inverse supply curve for our Cobb-Douglas example.  
The solutions to the firm’s problem are well behaved for all the parameter values in 
the graph
17.  Figure 5 plots the elasticity of total hours with respect to a minimum 
wage as we change the hours intensity of the production function.  One can see that 
when the weight on workers and firms in the production function are similar the 
presence of fixed costs creates a range of parameter values where total hours worked 
increases as we demonstrated earlier.  We see in Figure 5 that in fact there is a wider 
range of parameter values where the elasticity of hours is positive in long run 
equilibrium than there is when we look at the firms initial response to the minimum 
wage. 
                                                 
17 A maple file generating the graphs and showing that the firms second order conditions are satisfied 
and that profits hours workers the number of firms etc. are all positive for all the examples given is 
available from the authors on request.   21 
 
Section V: The impact of the minimum wage on profits and worker utility 
  The analysis in the previous section modelled firm entry and we see below has 
some unusual results:   
 
Proposition 3: If Proposition 1(b) holds the change in the long run equilibrium level 
of firm profits resulting from a minimum wage will have the same sign as the slope of 
the hours wage locus. 
Proof: See Appendix 3 (g) 
 
This result makes intuitive sense given the framework we have adopted.  That 
is, if the hours wage locus has a positive slope a minimum wage often causes the firm 
to substitute from hours into workers as we saw in Proposition 1.  If the firm is 
starting at the optimum any negative impact of this change on profits will be small.  
However, as all firms substitute from hours to workers, the demand for workers falls 
and as we saw in the previous section the equilibrium hours locus shifts down which 
causes a first order increase in firm profits and a fall in worker utility.  While 
Proposition 3 reflects a possible positive equilibrium impact of minimum wages on 
profits we certainly do not conclude from this that we should typically expect profits 
to increase after a minimum wage.  Even in the simple framework we have adopted 
we can easily change the model to make the impact on profits ambiguous.  The 
previous section assumed a minimum wage was imposed just above the optimal wage 
that would be chosen by firms in a free market so that there was no direct reduction in 
profits from the minimum wage.  Of course as the minimum wage increases above 
this level profits will indeed fall. We can see this immediately for our Cobb-Douglas 
example by examining Figure 1.  As the minimum wage increases, the firm is forced   22 
 
onto higher points on the hours wage locus which will intersect with a lower profit 
isoprofit curve. 
We can think of many cases where minimum wages apply but where we might 
expect market level labour supply elasticities for low wage workers to be large.  State 
level minimum wages in the U.S or other countries, sectoral level minimum wages, or 
even minimum wages in small open economies where migration is prevalent are 
examples.  In this case we might reasonably model the inverse labour supply curve in 
Figure 3 as being horizontal at the level of v determined in the larger labour market.  
If this were so the equilibrium wage hours locus would not shift in response to a 
minimum wage and as the minimum wage increased firms would exit reducing 
employment and hours. 
Another feature of our model that is necessary for tractability, but again would 
have important implications for the impact of a minimum wage on profits or worker 
utility, is the absence of heterogeneity across workers and firms.  In a model with 
more heterogeneity the equilibrium hours wage locus would be a set of tangency 
points between different types of workers and firms where workers with a relative 
preference for longer hours would match with firms with a relatively hours intensive 
technology as in Kinoshito (1987).  In such a model a minimum wage would 
potentially have different effects on the demand for different types of workers and on 
the profits of different types of firms.  For example if the wage hours locus had a 
positive slope we would expect firms initially choosing a wage below the minimum to 
have an initial reduction in profit after a minimum wage, while we might imagine 
there might well be an increase in demand for workers who initially chose to work at 
hours wage bundles above the minimum wage.  
   23 
 
 Section IV: Conclusion  
The idea that minimum wages may lead to offsetting effects on hours per 
worker is generally recognised in the literature. However, given the prevalence of 
studies that focus solely on the number of workers, we suspect that the fact that 
changes in hours per workers and the number of workers from a minimum wage can 
be either positive or negative and that theory predicts that the two will typically be 
inversely related in a competitive labour market is not yet well understood.  
While we show that there are cases where firms may respond to a minimum 
wage by increasing total hours, we are not suggesting that one should necessarily 
expect this to be typically true. Having said this, the parameter values where total 
hours effects are positive are not implausible (the effect may be positive for small 
fixed effects if the elasticity of output with respect to hours and workers are similar in 
the production function).  It may well be that different firms in different sectors with 
different technologies could be affected very differently by a minimum wage. This 
means that while empirical analysis that focuses on a homogeneous group of low 
skilled workers (say in the fast food industry) will resolve a lot of estimation problems 
and may provide compelling results for that group of workers, the theoretical analysis 
implies that even if labour markets are competitive the results may not be 
representative of the impact of a minimum wage across all industries. 
We have also shown that a firm may increase total hours after a minimum 
wage and yet workers may have lower utility in equilibrium.  Since one could 
reasonably argue that the participation rate of workers is positively related to the 
utility of jobs on offer, then if one wishes to test whether minimum wages increase or 
decrease worker utility in a model with offsets, a simple route might be to determine 
whether the aggregate number of workers employed has increased.  More precisely, if   24 
 
more workers are attracted to working in the labour market then utility must be higher 
in order to attract these workers.  At a market level therefore, we can plausibly argue 
that if the total number of workers employed rises in response to a minimum wage 
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Figure 1: equilibrium wages and hours 
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Figure 3: Short and long run market equilibrium 
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Table A1: Equilibrium values for the Cobb Douglas example 
Output (
0.45 0.55 yhn  )  0.55 
Utility  () uw h th  ]  0.5 
Profit (π) 0.96 
Hours per worker (h)  0.60 
Number of workers (n)  0.52 
Wage 2.08 
Simulated model from appendix 1. where M=t=k=1 and S=0.  The first column solves for values at the 
equilibrium market clearing wage.  Since we assume a unit mass of workers are available we set the 





Cobb-Douglas production and utility function 
 
In this section we illustrate our results using a Cobb-Douglas example.  This 
example is used to generate the results in Table A1 above and Figures 1 through 5
18. 
The technology over hours and workers is
b an h h n f  ) , ( .  A commonly used 
approach is to model the aggregate labour labour input asHn h
   .
19  I t  i s  a l s o  
important to remember that the technology above is for producing labour inputs and 
that one might expect that there is a diminishing marginal product associated with the 
labour input.  One example would be  ()
ab f HHn h h n
     
20 where both a and 
b are less than unity.   Relative to b, a small value for a means a worker intensive 
production function, while a large value for a implies an hours intensive production 
function.  We note that in this case equation (1.3) becomes: 
                                                 
18 A maple file generating these simulations and graphs is available from the authors on  request. 
19 See Hamermesh (1993) for example. 
20 Another way of looking at it is that there are s other inputs x1..xs in addition to labour L and  a Cobb-
Douglas production function 
1
11 ( ,.. , ) ...
s b
ss f xx H x x H
   .  The comparative static analysis 
would be much more complicated if we add more inputs, but the example shows that it would be 








f dn dh a n dh n
dw f dw b h dw

   A(1.18) 










dn h d h d n b a d h
nhn
dw dw dw b dw

  A(1.19) 
To solve for equilibrium hours we continue by assuming that workers have the Cobb-
Douglas utility function:  () uc lvw h Thv    . Workers have a reservation utility 
S as described in Section III and v is a fixed cost associated with going to work.  At 










For the moment we take the equilibrium value of u as given.  We solve for labour 
market equilibrium in the simple example described below. Given the utility function 
the slope of the hours wage locus is just the slope of the indifference curve of the 
marginal worker: 
 
2 [( ) ]
(2 )
dh h t h





It follows that if t>2h then  0 
dw
dh
 and if t<2h then  0 
dw
dh
. The representative 









 From the first order conditions on n and w we get the following quadratic form for h: 
 
22 () [ ( ) 2 ] 0
ab
ut kt u kt h kh
a

    A(1.23) 
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   A(1.24) 
Given these considerations the easiest way to proceed is to simulate the model.  Table 
A1 above assumes parameter values and equilibrium outcomes.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 
Using equation A(1.20) above Figure 1 traces out the worker’s indifference 
curve for the assumed values for u and t given in Table A1.  Taking the first order 
condition on n we can rewrite A(1.22) in terms of the hourly wage w and trace out the 
relationship between hours and the wage at the equilibrium level of profit.  This is the 
isoprofit curve plotted in Figure 1.  
  Again from the profit maximising solution for n and h we can solve for 
the equilibrium cost of production c.  Solving cw h nn k   for h and using A(1.20) 
for w.  This gives the isocost curve in Figure 2.  Using the solutions for h and n from 
profit maximisation we calculate the equilibrium value of output.  Using this value we 
rearrange the production function in terms of h and this gives the isoquant in Figure 2.   
 
Long  run market equilibrium 
If we assume that v has a uniform distribution over the unit interval and that 
reservation utility is normalised to zero then we get the equilibrium condition for 
worker participation  (, ) ( ) Dhw w hT h v   and also that labour supply is: 
s Nv M  .  
We assume a positive linear relationship between firm entry and profits F f   
where we set f equal to unity.  Labour demand is 
d Nn F n f   .  Since profit 
depends on the output price level p, for convenience we set this at 3.835 (this value   32 
 
ensures that the equilibrium value of v*=0.5 and the demand for workers equals the 
supply where half the population are employed).  Once we solve for the equilibrium 
number of firms we fix it and let v change to get the short run inverse demand curve 
in Figure 3.  Figure 4. Graphs the two terms in the denominator of equation A(1.40) 
below for the Cobb-Douglas example.  These are the slope of the market inverse 




Condition for scale effect on hours to be positive. 
Firms that maximise the profit function in equation (1.1) must be minimising the cost 
of producing output.  The cost minimisation problem is described in the following 
Lagrangean function where lambda is the Lagrange multiplier. 
  () { [,(] } wh w n nk q f n h w       A(1.25) 
The first order conditions on w, n and λ respectively are: 
 
(,,) () () [,() ] () 0
(,,) () [,() ] 0
(, , ) [,() ] 0
ww h w
nn
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Totally differentiating the first order conditions with respect to w,n,λ and q we get the 
following matrix system: 
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If we call the (3X3) matrix above A, we can use Cramer’s rule and the assumption 
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Note that λ>0 (since λ is marginal cost).  The second order conditions for cost 






 .  Thus the term in squared brackets in A(1.28)  must be negative 
implying: 
 










   A(1.29) 











  A(1.30) 
 
The two terms in this inequality will be equal when scale effects are zero.  We also 
note that we could reverse the signs of the inequalities given in A(1.28) to A(1.30) to 











 .  
It is instructive to analyse the impact of a minimum wage on the cost minimisation 
problem.  We totally differentiate the first order conditions on n and λ from A(1.26) to 















   
          

 A(1.31) 
Using Cramer’s rule again we get the substitution effect of a change in the wage on 




















(a) Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Using (1.5) in (1.6) the elasticity of total hours with respect to the minimum wage can 

























Next we assume that hours per worker is not an inferior input.  That is 0
dh
dq
  for the 
production function  (,) qf n h  . We show in Appendix 2 that this assumption holds 
when marginal costs are positive and equation A(1.29) is satisfied.  Equation A(1.29) 






f f n x
ff

  .  In the 
special case where the scale effect on hours equals zero x also equals zero.  Using this 
























The condition for the numerator and denominator of A(1.34) to be positive, where it 
follows that the elasticity of total hours with respect to a minimum wage is positive 



















From (1.5) if the hourly wage locus has a positive slope the denominator of A(1.34) is 
positive.  But since x,h and n are positive if  qn qh     the numerator of A(1.34) is 
positive implying  , 0 nh w   .   
 
 
(b) Showing that   and  wv hh will have the opposite signs 
Using the fact that equation (1.8) will always hold in equilibrium, even after a 
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 must have the same sign to ensure that this equation 










 w h e n  t h e  w a g e  i s  f i x e d .  T o  
illustrate this imagine that the indifference curve in Figure 1 is the equilibrium hours 
wage locus.  An increase in h when the wage is held fixed at any point puts the 
workers on a higher indifference curve starting from any point where the indifference 
curve has a negative slope and on a lower indifference curve starting from a point 














(c)  Proof of Proposition 1(a) 
 


























We can insert this in (1.12) or (1.13) to get the equilibrium change in employment: 
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The slope of the inverse supply curve is  v MG while from (1.11) the slope of the 


















   then Y>0 and 




(d) Proof of Proposition 2 (a) 
 






f h n w
f hp f

 , using (1.6) and A(1.37) we can write the 
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dw dw
 A(1.38) 
Using A(1.37) and A(1.36) this can be written as: 
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Where  0 v AM G N   is the slope of the inverse labour supply Curve times the 






 since we are concerned with the case where 










  since the slope of the inverse supply curve is greater 
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
  is equation (1.6) the change 
in total hours at the level of the firm and A(1.39) is a positive transformation of this 
and Proposition 2 will continue to hold. 






(e) Proof of Proposition 1 (b) 
Supply and demand for workers will be equal in equilibrium so that one can equate 
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The slope of the inverse market supply curve is  v MG and the slope of the inverse 
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.  If the slope of the inverse supply curve is larger Y1>0 
and comparing with equation (1.3) we see that Proposition 1 will continue to hold. 
 
 
(f) Proof of Proposition 2 (b) 
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The denominator of A(1.43) is the slope of the inverse labour supply curve less the 
slope of the restricted inverse labour demand curve which is positive by assumption.  
The numerator is the same as the numerator of A(1.39) in the proof of proposition 








.  Since we are concerned 





 by assumption and as shown 














(g) Proof of Proposition 3 
 If Proposition 1(b) holds Y1>0 and from A(1.40)  w v has the opposite sign to  w h  




h dd v d v
hn
dv dw h dw

 .  Since  v h and  w h have opposite signs from Appendix 3 (b) 
the change in profits will have the same sign as the slope of the hours wage locus. 
 